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From the Editor's desk



On September 19th, 1985, a devastating earthquake changed the lives of Mexicans forever. 32 years later, on the same day, the resilience and courage of my people were tested again when a major tremor shook our cities and homes to the ground.

As Editor, as a Mexican, as a great-grandson of victims who lost their lives in 1985, I would like to use this platform to honor all the people who died in the recent earthquakes that shattered our beloved country.

I dedicate these lines to all those mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters and friends that didn't have the opportunity to say their last goodbye. To those who lost everything they had in the blink of an eye. To those who are sentenced to keep on living without being able to embrace their relatives ever again. To the architects, designers, engineers, developers and workers who built resilient skyscrapers that, by resisting the thrust of nature, saved thousands of lives. To all those volunteers, authorities, celebrities, Mexican and foreign, young and elderly, students and professionals, men and women, soldiers and rescuers who crowded the streets of Mexico City day and night to help ease the pain in any way they could. To Frida and all her kin. To all those friends who called from abroad just to check up on us and to find out how they could contribute to our cause.

These past weeks have changed much more than our physical reality. The recent events made us remember the inequitable prowess and unity of the Mexican people. We remembered how much other countries care for us. We stood up to the challenge and faced the odds as one. However, the

challenge remains. Farewell videos of foreign rescuers boarding a plane and heading back to their countries imbue us with a sense of solitude and vulnerability. The aftermath of this disaster will require our effort and unity.

Nonetheless, I dare feel optimistic and hopeful. For the first time in my life, I'm proud to say that I witnessed the ascendance of a united and caring country. For the first time in my life, I dare believe that the good will of the Mexican people can outweigh any form of division or hate speech.

Let us rebuild our country and learn from our mistakes. For us. For the ones that will come after. For the ones who are not here anymore. For Mexico City, Oaxaca, Chiapas, the State of Mexico, Puebla, Morelos and Guerrero. For the ones who watch us from afar: Mexico will rise once again!

¡Fuerza México!



Raúl Ruiz

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México

Nayef Al-Rodhan



Simbiotic Realism and the Emotionality of States

Interview with Dr. Nayef Al-Rodhan

By Raúl Ruiz

Nayef Al-Rodhan began his career as a neurosurgeon and neuroscientist. He trained in neurosurgery and conducted neuroscience research at the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota in the United States.

In 1993, on a fellowship from the Congress of Neurological Surgeons, he joined the department of neurosurgery at the Yale University School of Medicine. In 1994, Nayef Al-Rodhan became a fellow at the department of neurosurgery at the Massachusetts General Hospital at Harvard Medical School, where he worked on the study of neuropeptides, molecular genetics, and neuronal regeneration.

Since 2002, Nayef Al-Rodhan has shifted his scholarly focus to the interplay between neuroscience and international relations. Through several publications, he has pioneered the application of neuroscience and the neuro-behavioural consequences of the neurochemical and cellular mechanisms that underpin emotions, amorality, egoism, fear, greed, and dominance, into the analysis and conceptualization of trends in contemporary geopolitics, global security, national security, transcultural security, and war and peace. He became a Senior Member of St. Antony's College, Oxford University where he analyses, amongst other things, critical turning points in the Arab-Islamic world and their current and future regional and global geopolitical relevance.

Biography Source: <http://www.sustainablehistory.com/about-nayef-alrodhan/>

Q In the field of study of International Relations, regarding the observation of emotions and rationality, you have argued that, “The role and political repercussions of human ego, emotions and sensibilities in state conduct and international relations are, less transient and more pervasive than it is often acknowledged.”

For this matter, you have proposed the theory Symbiotic Realism. Could you give us a brief overview of what you propose through it?

A Symbiotic Realism is a theory of International Relations that goes beyond the state-centrism and parsimony of Realism. It does acknowledge the problem of global anarchy (in the sense that there is no overarching global authority) but also emphasizes the role of instant connectivity and interdependence, which are crucial realities of our century, and which were largely absent from European or global politics at the time when, for instance, Hobbes or Machiavelli theorized on states.

Furthermore, nowadays, states are not the only relevant actors on the international stage: non-state, commercial and military actors, regional blocs, transnational forces (cultural identities and communities existing across borders) have a say in global politics. Strong interdependence limits the capacity of states to go unrestrained and act solely in the name of an abstract *raison d'état*. We see this in the case of US-China relations, for instance, which share a relationship that is symbiotic: they each have economic and financial ties that bind them together in profound ways, making a confrontation virtually impossible to imagine because the stakes are too high on both sides.

Finally, Symbiotic Realism is an innovative theoretical framework because it takes insights from neuroscience. Classical Realism, like much of political philosophy, drew on certain understandings of human nature. These accounts were largely speculative and described mankind in very reductionist terms, as selfish, competitive, power-driven, and survival-oriented. From here on, they created an analogy men-states, inferring that states too, were selfish, obsessed with territory, resources and physical survival. Neuroscience gave us the tools and methods to go inside the brain and map

its regions and responses in ways that were not possible before. The result is that it has gradually started to challenge or even overturn some of our views of human nature and human morality. That does not mean that men (and states, by analogy) cannot also be immoral, egoistic etc, but they are much more complicated than that.

Q How would your framework serve to fill a gap that some experts—like Professor Roland Bleiker and Professor Emma Hutchison—have described as follows: “In most instances, emotions were simply seen as issues or phenomena to which rational decision makers react. The result is a somewhat paradoxical situation where emotions have been implicitly recognized as central but, at the same time, remained largely neglected in scholarly analyses understanding of the role of emotions but not ignored.”

A Symbiotic Realism argues, in a similar vein, that insights from neuroscience need to be integrated in IR scholarship. As mentioned above, for too long, political theory and Realism, especially, have been concerned with human nature – but they have drawn their conclusions from non-scientific assumptions about human nature, which they summarized in simplistic ways: that humans were selfish, power-driven, rational actors (rational meaning that they performs cost analyses calculations and choose whatever best maximizes their profits and power). Neuroscience casts these conclusions in far more nuanced tones. Different methods to study the human brain, such as with neuroimaging tools have shown that what is categorized as ‘rationality’ and ‘emotionality’ is not so easily distinguishable. Rather, we are far more emotional than we think we are, and far less rational than we like to believe. Emotions are critical to decision-making. After terrorism was suddenly ‘discovered’ as a global threat, there was also a new appreciation for the role of culture, and the thesis of the ‘clash of civilizations’ was revived for a while. This led to a sort of acceptance that identity and emotional expressions mattered in politics. But the deeper, neuroscience-based understanding of emotions was still not fully integrated in theory and policy analysis. Recent interdisciplinary exchanges between neuroscientists and IR scholars is challenging that limitation.

Another important finding from neuroscience is that every emotion and thought-process is expressed neurochemically, through specific reactions and changes in brain chemistry. This is a critical conclusion. Power, including political power, is also expressed neurochemically: increased levels of power lead to an increase of

dopamine, the same chemical that is involved in rewarding behavior, learning and activities that are pleasurable. Power is thus addictive to the extent that most activities that lead to an increase of dopamine are addictive, including behaviors that are self-destructive, such as drug addictions. Dictators and leaders that enjoy heightened levels of power are addicts in the sense that they will do whatever it takes, including acts of repression and eliminating dissent, just to maintain their position of power. At no other time in human history was power – or, indeed, any other concepts that are critical to IR theory – mapped and understood in such precise ways.

Q What can alternative approaches to world politics—such as the recognition of affection and emotions—tell us about world processes that traditional approaches wouldn't be able to? In other words, why should IR scholarship should focus more on the intersection between IR and emotions?

A For a start, because this approach is simply factually more accurate and grounded in evidence. There is some kind of prejudice or resistance against accepting the role of emotions because they are considered either a source of weakness or a hindrance to sound decision-making. It is therefore difficult to accept that emotions are so pervasive in human actions, in politics and even state behavior (it was, after all, excessive pride that pushed Napoleon into his Russian adventure!). It is important to accept the centrality of emotions in human actions because this can help us better understand our actions and politics. This has normative implications too. Once we understand human nature more accurately, we can improve our governance models to make them more sustainable and inclusive.

Q In a paper entitled *Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics*, Professor Neta Crawford has stressed that, “Institutionalization of emotion is ubiquitous in world politics, not an outlier or exception, and understanding the content and process of the institutionalization of emotion illuminates perennial concerns of our discipline.”

In your opinion, what methods are most appropriate to render emotions susceptible to political scrutiny?

A This is a sensitive question because it can imply methods to ‘police’ emotions.

That said, it is certainly true that emotions (and passions, as Prof Crawford mentions) are everywhere in our institutions. Behind institutions charged with ensuring our safety and security, there is – beforehand – the sense of fear that led to need for such institutions in the same place. We can at the same time say that institutions that create apartheid, slavery or racial discrimination are also rooted in emotions: fear, bias and mistrust of the other. As a baseline, any institution that actively creates or reinforces discriminations of any kind, need to be scrutinized and dismantled, no matter what the ‘emotions’ behind them.

Q Are there any issues we should be cautious with when talking about theorizing emotions in IR—like the risk of homogenizing emotions and not understanding how emotions acquire different meanings and credence in different contexts?

A Absolutely. From the reticence to accept the role of emotions, we could turn to the exact opposite side of the spectrum, whereby we would ubiquitously refer to emotions, in general, as if they were some sort of amalgam of mental states that define human behavior.

Q Former contributor of our journal, Dr. Tereza Capelos, has recently helped us understanding the intersection between IR and Political Psychology. Among many other things she asserts that, “People are emotional beings to the same extent that they are cognitive beings. Studies in Neuroscience show us that emotion and cognition work together, and the duality we impose in our work is actually arbitrary.

“We might want to think about emotion and cognition analytically as separate processes, but they are part of the same brain. Our brain thinks cognitively as much as it thinks emotionally. Think about it – there is no actual switch that turns us from cognitive to emotional beings and back, as some cognitive processing models suggest. So, when we try to understand political leaders and their behavior separately in terms of cognition and emotionality, it is important to keep in mind that our theoretical and empirical models are only abstractions of the complex processes of decision making that involve both feelings and thoughts.”

What is your opinion of the statements put forward by Dr. Capelos?

A The distinction between emotion and cognition has been studied and discussed at length in recent years. A common view held for a long time was that there is a functional specialization in the brain and therefore there were parts concerned with cognition and others with emotions. Mounting evidence seems to suggest that, in fact, human cognition is intimately linked to emotion. For example, it has been shown that the amygdala – which is an almond-shaped structure on the medial temporal lobe – has a role in learning, processing of social stimuli and memory. The amygdala has a critical role in emotional processes and especially in the acquisition and expression of conditioned fear responses. It also has a role in fear learning in a social context and it has even been suggested that it might have a role in cultural learning, in the sense that it may be involved in acquisition of social stereotypes of race – but this will need further investigation. Emotions have an impact on how we process, learn, remember and perceive things and events around us.

Q Jonathan Mercer has said that, “understanding how rational actors think requires turning to emotions”. In your opinion, can we really say there is something like “purely rational thinking”?

A “Purely rational” is a really contentious notion, but perhaps we could say that to a limited extent, yes, there is such a thing mostly when it comes to decisions related to survival. When our survival is at stake, our decision-making mechanisms will make calculations that maximize our chances of survival. Even here, however, many more alternatives are possible. People can choose to sacrifice themselves to save a loved one or people can voluntarily choose to die for a cause or religious belief.

Q During a Kapuscinski Development lecture on Ethical and Security Implications of Emerging Technologies you stated that, “my concerns are not about physical but cognitive enhancements”.

To conclude, would further progress in the field of cognitive enhancement be a matter of interest for scholars in IR? How so?

A We are still in the early days of cognitive enhancement and the risks of these technologies or pharmaceuticals are already starting to surface. Technologies that ‘hack’ the brain in various ways, either to make individuals more focused and

productive, or to change their emotions (reducing or eliminating the feeling of fear, compassion or guilt) will be damaging for us in the long run and will create divisions and legal issues we cannot yet fully grasp, but have a moral obligation to try and regulate before they manifest their darkest side.

I could conclude that, left fully unregulated, cognitive enhancement will change societies and war-fighting in profound ways: they will affect the workplace; the way soldiers fight, and create new forms of social divisions and tensions.

For more information on the work carried out by Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan, we encourage all readers to visit the following website:

www.sustainablehistory.com

Growing Tensions: North Korea and the Trump Administration



By Matthew O'Neill

Matthew O'Neill is currently studying Arts/Law at Monash University, Australia. He has interned at the highest levels of political office with the Opposition Labor Party. For a period of time, he was appointed as President of the Monash International Affairs Society, which allowed him to broaden his knowledge and skills to analyze international issues.

Matthew's academic interests are varied, but he is highly interested in understanding the intersection between policy, business and international issues. In 2016, Matthew was selected to participate as delegate at the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He proactively participated in the panel of Governance and diplomacy.

ABSTRACT

That the North Korean question has remained unabated and unanswered throughout US Foreign Policy for the last 20 years is indicative of the issues complexity. That both U.S and South Korean leaders represent a break from conventional policy – Donald Trump who has never before held elected office, and Moon Jae-in who is moving away from Seoul’s traditionally conservative stance towards North Korea – may therefore be an antidote to a problem which has persistently plagued both countries.

Following the election of the new administration, this already complicated situation now takes place against a backdrop of inflammatory rhetoric - designed to force North Korea to curb its nuclear developments. Yet, as the recent assertion that the U.S declared war on North Korea suggests , such an environment is ripe for miscommunication and misunderstanding. This in-turn has the capability to undermine the one policy that has prevented warfare (though equally has allowed Pyongyang’s arsenal of weapons to grow): restraint.

This article seeks to assess the implications of the Trump Administration’s East Asia Policy in dealing with the North Korean Question. It does so by looking at (a) what expectations both the US and China have, and whether those expectations can be realised; (b) the extent to which domestic policy of the new South Korean administration is (in)compatible with the new US administration; (c) what effect historical alliances will have on the issue; and (d) what effect Russian involvement in the issue may have.

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resident Clinton had initial success in closing down a North Korean nuclear power plant, but ultimately presided over its re-opening. President Bush sought regime change in the country as part of the 'Axis of Evil', but failed to consider Seoul's fear of a premature reunification. President Obama in his inaugural address declared America's readiness to 'extend a hand' to North Korea, but was met with a series of missile launches and a second nuclear test within months of taking office. Under President Trump, the U.N. is in its 9th wave of sanctions against North Korea in nearly as many years. Having outlived the terms of multiple administrations, North Korea now threatens to outlast another. Thus for the Trump administration, the North Korean question can be framed as a whether or not it can live with North Korea as a nuclear state. At this point, parallels between the United States and Soviet Union will become inevitable, though their application, because of the different economical, historical and societal differences, will be limited.

North Korea occupies a central place within foreign policy analysis, yet the diversity of opinion that exists ultimately suggests a certain level of uncertainty and ambiguity about how to handle the matter. Indeed previous doctrines are of little use because they have been unable to prevent outright, or even slow down, the path to nuclearization. Since it first began its plans for nuclear development, North Korea's persistence to the program has been underestimated.

There is an important distinction to make in respect of US policy towards North Korea. It is focussed not on preventing North Korea from testing an ICBM, but rather denying North Korea the ability to have a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reach the US mainland. The former, at this point, is unachievable without significant damage both to human life and in economic terms.

The Eagle and the Dragon

An expectation deficit between what Washington thinks Beijing can do, and what it can actually do hinders U.S. attempts at denuclearization. For the former, the issue is one of unwillingness; for the latter it has become one of inability. Pyongyang is able to manipulate the bind that Beijing now finds itself in between its limited influence to affect the matter on one hand and implications of a belligerent nuclear power on its border on the other. That North Korea took the

belligerent nuclear power on its border on the other. That North Korea took the rare – although not unprecedented – move of firing two ballistic rockets over the Japanese mainland is an indication of this. With each development, more and more pressure – stemming from China’s perceived ability to influence North Korea – is placed on Beijing. China now sees the North Korean situation as an urgent ‘time-limited problem set’, yet its ability to deal with this problem is severely restricted.

Through China’s eyes, a stepping stone for denuclearization is the ‘dual freeze’ program: halting U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear developments. Yet this measure falls short in many respects. The most relevant in the context of the new President is that, given the aggressive stance adopted by Trump since taking office, anything that involves a de-escalation of rhetoric and/or a show of force is clearly inconsistent with President Trump’s way of dealing with North Korea, suggesting perhaps that the gesture was empty-handed. Indeed the North had previously proposed it to the Obama Administration on two separate occasions. Moreover, implementing it would also undermine support for the President domestically. This factor is crucial given his recent difficulties in pushing legislation through the Congress despite Republicans holding both houses.

The nature of relations between China and its southern neighbour will adjust, although the base of the relationship itself – stability for North Korea and a buffer zone for China – will remain constant. Yet North Korean media has gone as far as issuing criticism towards China, stating that it would pursue its current policy of nuclear armament even at the expense of risking a falling out with the country. In principle the North would never seek to unnecessarily damage relations with its closest neighbour, yet in practice the bind Beijing now finds itself in gives Pyongyang a new-found flexibility to test the boundaries of the relationship when beforehand it was unable to. China’s position is further complicated as it re-aligns itself to fulfil its desire to take-up the mantle of leadership through a ‘China Solution’; Beijing admonishes – economically and politically – North Korea, though it does so without abandoning it.

Moon and Sunshine

In adopting the policy known as ‘Sunshine’, President Moon demonstrated a desire for change rather than continuity. The move is modelled on Ostpolitik - the effort that facilitated the unification of West and East Germany. The premise is that actively seeking co-operation whilst not tolerating military provocations will lead to a more engaged North Korea, and one that would denuclearize by itself. Yet the

setting in which this policy was conceived is fundamentally different to the current geopolitical environment - in the late 1990s, North Korean nuclearization was dismissed as a thought bubble. This will invariably limit the effectiveness of South Korean engagement. Yet, its adoption should be unsurprising given Moon's role as one of the lead original architects of it. Moon has promised a less hard-line approach, and his election will likely constrain Trump's repeated threats of intervening alone. Writing as-then Presidential hopeful, he proclaimed that military action 'cannot happen without Korea's consent'. His election comes at a precipitous time for Sino-South Korean relations with the (reluctant) installation of the THAAD missile-defence system, though, by preventing further deployment of them, is attempting to placate some of China's anger. More broadly, the adoption of the Sunshine policy represents a break from the country's traditional stance towards North Korea.

Forged during the days of the Korean War, South Korea has, alongside Japan, been a principal U.S. ally in the Asia region. Yet there is an ostensible divergence between President Moon's more sensitive approach to diplomacy – manifested through a reversal of the previous conservative governments policy towards the North – and Trump's heavy-handed calls – manifested through calling for a 'unilateral' solution and the exertion of 'maximum pressure'. Trump has moved away from conventional policy to South Korea by stating that it, rather than the U.S., should pay for the \$1 billion THAAD defence system. Whereas his predecessors based decisions with a view to the historical and political ties with Seoul, Trumps approach of a 'good' or 'bad' deal rests largely on the economic value of the situation. This is exemplified in his decision to revisit the U.S. –South Korea Free-Trade Agreement (KORUS), and make possible amendments to a 'horrible' trade deal.

As countries seek to decouple underlying animosities from historical events from 20 matters of national security, it is U.S. policy rather than underlying tensions that will determine the effectiveness of a de-nuclearization policy. This extends not only to the rhetoric used by the President, but also to the hollowing-out of the State Department, where many senior positions are left vacant – including assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and, crucially, the Ambassador to South Korea. History nonetheless demonstrates that a convergence of U.S. and South Korean foreign policy is a necessary precondition for an outcome on the Korean Peninsula. President Bush's attempt of regime change received a strong rebuke from a Seoul fearful of a premature reunification. Economically, analyses put the costs of reunification at close to \$1 trillion, with a need to normalise the North's economy, ensure a redistribution of income to minimise inequality, and manage the states debts to cost the cover of reunification. Four

of the five nuclear weapons North Korea detonated came during President Obama's policy of 'strategic patience', while Seoul meanwhile was pursuing a consistently hard-line approach under its respective Conservative governments. This time, Moon's policy of reconciliation through 'parallel negotiations, sanctions' is inconsistent with Trump's heated rhetoric of 'maximum pressure'. Personality differences thus feed into policy differences. This incongruence leads hinders the establishment of a united front, undermining attempts for North Korean denuclearization.

Brinksmanship hinges most of all upon 'expectations and beliefs', and Trump's inflammatory rhetoric is part of an overarching strategy to manipulate the risk of war in order to force the North to back down. In the days following Trump's comments that the U.S. military was 'locked and loaded', Secretary of State Rex Tillerson took the rare step of writing a joint op-ed contradicting the President by writing that the U.S. has 'no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification'. The discrepancy between Trump's rhetoric and his administration's actions may be a calculated move to manipulate this theory, though is more probably a result of miscommunication than of strategy. This acts as a further wedge between Seoul and the U.S., and risks upsetting a relationship that has endured since before the mid 20th-century. Although evidence suggests that Presidents can retreat from these threats without losing domestic support by putting forward a plausible explanation, any de-escalation of rhetoric - given Trump's penchant for asserting power and control - is unlikely to occur. Such behaviour also acts as fuel for the North-Korean propaganda machine, allowing the regime to tighten its already ironclad grip over its population.

A Parallel History

Despite a new foreign policy approach by the US, the inextricable power dynamic between China and North Korea, forged during the Korean War, may ultimately limit the success a recalibration of US foreign policy towards North Korea. When faced with the prospect of regime change on Beijing's doorstep and war with the US, China chose the latter, despite the cost being more than a million Chinese casualties. Indeed, Mao Zedong at the time stated that the two sides were 'as close as lips and teeth'. North Korea has certainly become a greater liability for Beijing, yet its underlying interest in not having a unified and democratic Korea on its doorstep, stemming in part from historical aversion to perceived Western influence and in part from a desire to expand its influence outwards, is the single biggest factor in its calculations.

The Russian Response

Often overlooked yet of not insignificant importance, Russia will be an emerging power in this dispute. Indeed, it was Stalin who first sparked the Korean War, giving Kim Il Sung permission to invade the South in 1950. The North has either relied on Russia or China as being its most international partner. When for instance China suggests that it will withdraw oil supplies to North Korea, Russia indicated a willingness to step in. By displacing China as the principal political ally, Russia attempts to gain favour in the region - particularly in the context of increased Chinese influence throughout the Eurasian region as part of the One Belt, Road policy. Much akin to how the U.S. was able to play China off against Russia during the 1960s, North Korea now attempts to do the same. By using North Korea as a foothold, Russia may attempt to insert itself into Eastern Asian affairs in response to an increased Chinese presence in the Eurasia region through its One Belt, One Road policy. It has also done so by taking sides on South Korea's controversial THAAD weapons deployment, labelling it as having the capacity to be used as an offensive system. Although there is no evidence to suggest that such a capacity exists, the system, in forward-based mode, extends the radar's range, allowing THAAD to intercept missiles in the initial or even launch phase.

No longer a Pacific pacifist

Failing to prevent de-nuclearisation may lead to Japan having a heightened concern of, and corresponding desire for at least defence enhancing measures, and at most the same kind of weapons. Provocations such as the launching of a ballistic missile over the country make this more probable, particularly when combined with a perception of U.S. ambivalence towards its allies in the region. The corollary concern for Beijing is that it will see Japanese military expansion as being a direct threat to its national security. China already contends with Japan over the two countries' historical differences. When combined with signs that the country is evolving from its role as a historically non-belligerent state to one with a greater military capacity – for instance rewriting the constitution's pacifist clause by 2020 and increasing defence spending year on year to unprecedented levels – this adds an element of complexity to an already volatile environment by allowing misinterpretation and misapprehension to take root. Defence spending is high relative to previous years (2.5% growth on the previous year, leading to unprecedented levels of spending) but not with respect to other economies, where the amount spent is comparatively negligible. This will not stop countries viewing Japan's continuously rising military budget with a large dose of scepticism.

Thus, the implications of the North Korean question extend far beyond the Korean peninsula. The issue poses difficulties for the security of Asia as a whole because the precedent for an emerging power that feels contained leads to war, not peace. Thus, Japan's relationship with the U.S. is critical in the context of the larger Asian security story both now – as North Korea already has nuclear capabilities – and later, should it be successful in developing nuclear ICBM's. North Korea is, in essence, at the centre of Asia's security web. Ending the period of strategic patience could help reduce the above security tensions because it is – at least in large part – as a result of this policy that Japan is moving away from being a pacific pacifist. Yet the means being employed to achieve this – brinksmanship-esque rhetoric – may equally add further misunderstanding to a region that already has difficulties grappling with historical animosities, political differences and military expansion.

Conclusion

The lack of progress on the North Korean questions stems in part from imbalances within the relationships of the involved actors. Between Seoul and Washington, a difference of policy, flowing from a divergence in personality between the respective leaders, will operate to prevent a united front forming. This will undermine attempts to de-nuclearize.

Between Washington and Beijing, a gulf over what the former thinks the latter is capable of influencing, versus its actual ability (but also perhaps willingness) to do so hinders the relationship, however Beijing's recent recognition that the North Korean question is 'time-sensitive' may limit this. With China's assuming the mantle of global leadership, it will invariably have to 'play tough' on North Korean, potentially pushing Pyongyang towards Moscow

Japan's precarious security position exists both independently, but also perhaps consequently, of this scenario. Between Beijing and Seoul, tensions are only set to increase, because of the introduction of the THAAD system and in spite of Moon's willingness to engage.

The outcome of the North Korea question is inextricably linked to the web of security arrangements in Asia more broadly. Within the context of this strategic framework, tensions are likely to rise because of Trump's attitude towards the region, though so too may the possibility of some form of outcome as the period of 'strategic patience' is replaced.

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
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Roland Bleiker



Aesthetics and Emotions: Alternative Approaches to Understand World Politics

Interview with Dr. Roland Bleiker

By Raúl Ruiz

Roland Bleiker teaches across international relations, peace studies and political theory. His current research focuses on the role of images and emotions in politics. He directs a cross-disciplinary research program on Visual Politics, which brings together several dozen scholars from across the University of Queensland.

Bleiker grew up in Zürich, Switzerland, where he was educated and worked as a lawyer. He studied international relations in Paris, Toronto, Vancouver and Canberra. Bleiker worked for two years in a Swiss diplomatic mission in the Korean DMZ and held visiting affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague.

Some of Professor Bleiker's publications are: Theorizing emotions in world politics (with Emma Hutchison), The Visual Dehumanisation of Refugees, Aesthetics and world politics, Autoethnographic international relations: Exploring the self as a source of knowledge, among many others.

Biography Source: <https://polsis.uq.edu.au/profile/1168/roland-bleiker>

Q When talking about understanding societies, former contributor of our journal, Professor Miguel A. Centeno, once told us that: “War can serve as a mirror of society. Explaining war is contextual and idiosyncratic. Moreover, we can understand the society by studying the kind of war it practices.” In 2009, you wrote the book *Aesthetics and World Politics*.

Based on your research, could you tell us what can aesthetics offer as an alternative political insight? What would it tell us about a society that traditional approaches wouldn't be able to?

A The first thing to point out is that aesthetics is more than the study of art, literature and music. We need to understand aesthetics as an attempt to broaden our tools and intellectual approaches and not only rely on the kind of legacy inherited from the enlightenment. We should also draw on some of the more creative and intuitive aspects of our mind to bring out perspectives we wouldn't normally see - to bring into view actors or people that wouldn't be considered in International Politics analysis; to highlight the emotional dimensions of politics that don't seem to get recognized by social scientific approaches.

Let me give you an example. Pablo Picasso painted *La Guernica*, which is one of the most powerful depictions of war. It is powerful not because it tries to reach some authentic depiction of the world or because it looks at empirical elements, it is powerful because it plays with our imagination, because it appeals to our emotions. It deals with the emotional dimensions of war which are very often left out in the process of understanding world politics and international affairs in general.

Q In 2015, you published an article entitled "Pluralist Methods for Visual Global Politics", where among other things you gave an interesting example. You wrote that: “Our understanding of terrorism, for instance, is inevitably intertwined with how images dramatically depict the events and actors in question and with how politicians and the public respond to these depictions. Images are, of course, not new, nor have they necessarily replaced words as the

main means of communication. But images are now produced and circulated in ever faster and more complex ways and in the context of a rapidly changing global media economy.”

In the same sense, Professor Alex Schmid, has recently told us that: “The Western commercialized media want to sell products that attract readers/listeners/viewers and “selling fear” is something that works. As Brigitte Nacos said (and I quote from memory): “Journalists and terrorists are not involved in a love affair. They are strange bed fellows in a marriage of convenience”. Both want large audiences and violence attracts audience.”

What is your opinion of Professor Schmid’s statements regarding the relationship between media and terrorism? More importantly, how would you say instant connectivity and disruptive technologies have influenced the field of visual global politics?

A I think he makes a great point. In many ways, a terrorist attack is designed for visual and media impact. Terrorist attacks aren’t just about killing people in a local context, they are about trying to do so and gain global media attention. For instance, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were not only designed to kill people in New York, they were designed to make an absolute spectacle and to scare people both locally and around the world.

The interesting thing about the dimension you mentioned earlier is that images are not new. Even in pre-modern times images circulated widely. Now, I think there are two ways in which images have become critically more important and changed dramatically in recent years. The first has to do with the speed at which images circulate. Images used to circulate quite slowly, even a few decades ago during the Vietnam war, it would take quite a few days if not weeks for the photographs taken in the warzone to appear at the front page of a newspaper. Today, images picked up can circulate immediately around the world.

Furthermore, the second element is a particularly interesting case: what one can call the “democratization of the visual field”. A couple of decades ago the circulation of images was limited to big media networks, but today, almost anyone can take a photograph on a smartphone or tablet and put it on social media to make it circulate. Terrorist organizations have made use of that. The Islamic State, for instance, circulates images and videos of beheadings with the aim of spreading fear among people.

So, these two elements, the speed of images and the fact that almost anyone can take an image and make it circulate, have come to define our age. Some people, such as Tom Mitchell, even argue that we live in a “visual age” because of the importance of images.

Q In the same article, you talk about the methodological issues of recognizing the importance of images in International Relations. You indicate that, “One point is immediately clear: the politics of images is far too complex to be assessed through a single method”.

Could you share more light on your proposed “combination of methods” to study images in this sense and on the obstacles and benefits faced when using a multidisciplinary approach like the one you propose?

A Images work in very complex ways. There is a very interesting visual methods expert – Gillian Rose - who speaks of three realms in which images operate: First comes the construction of an image. You have to understand who takes images, how these images make it to the newspaper front-page or how they make it to the internet.

Then you have the issue of understanding the content of images. Finally, you face the challenge of understanding the actual impact of images, that is to say, how they shape and change our lives and politics. Each of these tasks require several different methods. For instance, we can use a content analysis, discourse analysis or semiotics to understand the content of images. These are designed to read what an image is and what it symbolizes.

However, these methods have done nothing to study the impact of images. For that purpose, we need a method like ethnography or quantitative surveys. These methods can tell us about the impact of an image. But then again, they cannot tell us anything about the construction of images or their content. So, these methods are designed to understand just one part of the visual field.

Another problem is that most people are not trained to use many different methods. People who do quantitative surveys don’t usually do discourse analysis or semiotics. Plus, there tends to be unnecessary hostile relationships between scholars who work in qualitative and quantitative fields. My suggestion is that we need to try to use multiple methods, even if they don’t seem to be compatible at first sight. In my view

that is the only way we can understand the complexity of images and there is no single method that does justice to this effort.

Q In 2014, you co-authored the paper entitled, "Theorizing Emotions in World Politics." There are some points about this work that I'd like to ask you about.

First, you argue that, "Emotions have for long played an implicit but important role in international relations. In fact, few realms are more infused with emotion: war and terrorism, for instance, are highly emotional phenomena". So, in your opinion, why has there been a strong absence of studies focusing on emotions in the field of International Relations? Would studying emotions benefit the long-criticized lack of a scientific methodology in IR?

A I got involved in this field because I found that it is impossible to understand images without understanding emotions. Simply because images often work in incredibly emotional ways. I come back to the example of the images shown during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which were extremely emotional. While looking at images it is inevitable not to have an emotional reaction. It is in this context that I started the work with Emma Hutchison on the politics of emotions.

I think it is also impossible to understand politics without emotions because these have always been central to politics. But of course, we also have an intellectual legacy coming out of the enlightenment that is largely based on science and reason. An intellectual legacy in which emotions seem to be marginalized and this legacy works under the assumption that emotions are private and not part of the public field. Therefore, in most traditional approaches to International Politics, emotions did not play an important role and have even been expelled from the field. However, over the last 25 years more and more scholars have understood the importance of emotions and it has become perhaps one of the most exciting fields in International Politics now. There is a great variety of people who work on emotions, whether it's in the field of war, terrorism, personal diplomacy or alliances.

Q Secondly, you also talk about an alternative conceptualization that oscillates between micro and macro approaches. Can you tell us more about these approaches and why you chose to focus on them in your article?

Bearing in mind those statements, you have also written about the “risks of homogenizing emotions”. How important is it to understand how specific emotions acquire different meanings in different cultural contexts, not only for negotiations but for IR in general?

In your view, has enough work been done in terms of fear-management and communication? What challenges remain for communication and resilience to be integral parts of counterterrorism measures?

A I agree with the fact that emotions are deeply linked with cultural and historical traditions. I think one of the biggest examples is the link between language, emotions and politics. In different contexts people have different ways of understanding and experiencing language. For example, in some places people have half a dozen different words to refer to snow, simply because snow is part of their environment, whereas, people who live in different environmental conditions only have one word for snow.

Thus, we can perceive people’s relationship with the environment and that goes with any aspect of politics. The cultural world around us is a kind of framework through which we understand the world, politics, society or even personal relations. So, I think one of the key aspects scholars need to understand is the extent to which emotions, culture, power and politics are intertwined, as well as how they shift or continue and what role they play in framing International Politics.

For more information on the work carried out by Professor Roland Bleiker, we encourage all readers to visit the following website:

<http://researchers.uq.edu.au/researcher/617>

Cloudy with a Chance of Infringement: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Information Privacy Concerns and the Regulatory Implications for the Cross-border Transfer of Data in the Cloud Computing Industry



By Emily Jones

Emily graduated with a First Class degree in International Business with Chinese at the University of Edinburgh in July 2017. She completed academic exchanges at Peking University in Beijing, China and Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand and earned a scholarship to study Chinese translation and culture at the National Taiwan University in Taipei.

She has interned at the American Chamber of Commerce Beijing and the US Department of Commerce Singapore. Determined to foster stronger relations between east and west, she served as co-chair of the 2017 Edinburgh International Asia Conference. Also passionate about women in leadership, Emily co-founded the 2017 Edinburgh Undergraduate Women in Business Summit.

ABSTRACT

This article looks at the cross-cultural perceptions of information privacy to understand the implications for the development of regulations governing the cloud computing industry. It focuses on two culturally dissimilar nations, the United Kingdom, in which a relatively strong regulatory framework exists for the protection of information privacy, and the People's Republic of China, in which nascent privacy regulations are developing with rapid speed. In both countries, governments have championed the development and implementation of information technologies as a key source of future economic growth. Understanding similarities and differences in information privacy concerns across cultures can provide significant insight to policymakers and corporate management cooperating to create a regulatory framework for the cross-border transfer of data.

For my undergraduate honours dissertation, I conducted three independent studies: (1) a review of the literature on information privacy regulatory development; (2) a survey of information privacy concerns; and (3) individual interviews. Drawing upon both theory and findings in the primary research, it led to recommendations for a joint application of the responsive regulatory model based on the mutual recognition of shared information privacy concerns.

The author hopes this paper may serve as the foundation for enhanced multilateral dialogue between the UK, China and other countries to ensure the smooth transfer of data across jurisdictional boundaries. Such dialogue will support the diffusion of the economic and social benefits of the cloud and the industries it so supports. This article is a summary of my findings and proposed solutions.

”

Information as a rubric is both pervasive and difficult to define – omnipresent, but quiet and unobtrusive in ordinary political and commercial contexts. No fully adequate tradition for dealing with these matters exists, and yet there is a growing awareness of their importance.”

–William L. Fishman, *Stanford Journal of International Law* (1980)

Information technologies are portrayed as posing a credible challenge to the continued relevancy of territorial borders (Cairncross, 1997). The literature points to freedom of trade and enhanced communication capabilities enabled by advances in information technology as mutually reinforcing drivers of globalization (Friedman, 2005; Wolf, 2004; Gourevitch, 1996; Fraser and Oppenheim, 1997). There is great potential, however, that such drivers instead clash. As challenges related to the collection and cross-border transmission of information arise due to concerns associated with the loss of privacy, there remains the possibility that we cannot simultaneously and fully realize the mutually symbiotic benefits of free trade and information technology.

Privacy, although a universal value, manifests itself in culturally specific ways as defined by the unique social, political and historical context of the country (Altman, 1977). Cultural traditions, defined by Gourevitch as “different traditions in networking, personal relationships, conceptions of authority, models of organisations and individuals,” have been shown to block or refract systemically derived pressures (Gourevitch, 1996; Cortell, 2006; Katzenstein, 1975).

The Chinese word for “privacy” is “yin-si” and has a much different connotation from its English counterpart. Farrall notes that the equation of “privacy” with “yin-si” restricts potential dialog between Chinese and English-speaking cultures (Farrall, 2008). In ancient China, the term “possesses derogatory sense and means illegitimate sexual relationship that people do not want to be disclosed” (Wang, 2011). “Yin” refers to shade, thus representing something one wants to hide. “Si” can represent “private,” “selfish,” “secret,” and “illicit” (Wang, 2011). Today, however, Chinese ideas of privacy are experiencing great changes such that the term “yin-si” now includes all personal information that people do not want others to know (Wang, 2011; Lu, 2005).

Attempts to ameliorate culturally diverse and distinct privacy concerns have resulted in a multitude of fragmented regulations governing the cross-border transfer of data, effectively raising new barriers to trade.

Constraints Surrounding the Cross-border Transfer of Data in the Cloud Will Impede Productivity and Stifle Innovation

Cloud computing is a “model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell and Grant, 2011). Cloud computing underpins and drives technological advancements in fields such as advanced mobile applications, big data analytics and AI (Manyika et al, 2013). In 2012, the EU Parliament issued a report on cloud computing (“2012 EU Report”) recognizing the technology’s power to “induce savings and facilitate innovative online services” (Alleweldt et al, 2012).

As the PRC seeks to move from a labour-intensive manufacturing economy to a service-oriented economy, data will become increasingly important to its value-adding activities. Bolstered by government support at both national and provincial levels as a part of the “Internet Plus” action plan, Chinese internet companies have been rapidly and vigorously expanding cloud infrastructure. Alibaba experienced increased cloud revenue growth of 138% in fiscal year 2016 compared to fiscal year 2015 (Alibaba Group Holdings Limited, 2016).

Growth in the use of such services, however, is constrained both directly and indirectly by privacy concerns. As Nir Kshetri notes, the storage and analytical capabilities of big data applications are risks to privacy and security (Kshetri, 2016). In its annual report, Alibaba noted that “challenges and risks in relation to data protection and data privacy” could result in significant penalties, increased costs and a severe disruption to business (Alibaba Group Holdings Limited, 2016). In the 2012 EU Report, the authors identified a number of priority actions that needed to be taken in order to increase the cloud’s adoption. It recognised “the biggest perceived barriers for both consumer and SME take-up of cloud computing are lack of privacy (. . .) and jurisdictional issues relating to applicable law and law enforcement access to data” (Alleweldt et al, 2012).

Data localisation requirements are a significant threat to the cross-border transfer of data between jurisdictions. Requirements to store data in the home country of citizens,

such as in Article 37 of the PRC's forthcoming Cybersecurity Law effective 1 June, 2017 (The Central People's Government of the PRC, 2016), and Article 7 of the PRC's draft Notice on Regulating Business Behaviours in the Cloud Service Market (MIIT, 2016b), may impede foreign cloud providers from operating in the country, reducing competition that is so vital to national innovation and competitive advantage (Porter, 1990).

A study by The European Centre for International Political Economy found that the policies could cost China as much as 1.1% of its GDP and reduce investment by 3.9% (Bauer et al, 2014). According to Leviathan Security Group, the cost to host data increases by 30-60% for firms forced to comply with data localisation requirements (Leviathan Security Group, 2015).

A key challenge associated with addressing information privacy concerns outlined above is the broad divergence in approaches to the governance of information privacy (Milberg et al, 2000). The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) regulate global trade in goods and services respectively, but there does not exist a multilateral framework for the regulation of global trade in data. Currently, the OECD 1981 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data provide the broadest level of coverage internationally (OECD, 1980).

Data Privacy Regulatory Development

While Graham Greenleaf writes that “there is no settled academic or official consensus on the minimum standards required for a ‘data privacy law,’” there are principles that have been developed and used as foundations for a number of national regulatory frameworks for data privacy (Greenleaf, 2014b).

Greenleaf proposes that a country has a data privacy law if legislation (a) is of comprehensive national scope, (b) provides a set of “minimum” data privacy principles, (c) at a standard “at least” of the international agreements in the 1980s with (d) official enforcement (Greenleaf, 2014b). The (c) international agreements of the 1980s refer to the OECD and CoE frameworks (OECD, 1980; Council of Europe, 1981).

It is important to note that such (b) principles are grounded in privacy being an established “right of the individual,” a term which may sound very foreign in the

context of countries characterised by high degrees of collectivism and marked by the absence of traditional human rights protections similar to those of the EU (Hofstede, 2017; Council of Europe, 2010). The multilevel legal structure of China is also not directly comparable to western legal architectures (de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015; Keller, 1994).

Information Privacy Regulatory Environment: United Kingdom

The United Kingdom information privacy regulatory environment will be analysed in the context of the country's current status as an EU Member State. Speculating the impact that the UK's trigger of Article 50 will have on information privacy regulations is beyond the scope of this paper.

The EU data protection model has been summarised as a “principles-driven system that is implemented through a standard set of regulatory mechanisms” (de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015). It launched the first major legislative texts on data privacy, and today has a relatively comprehensive framework with the individual's fundamental right to privacy described as being proactively protected by the government (Long and Quek, 2002). The individual right to privacy is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2010). The UK Human Rights Act 1998 gives further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention (United Kingdom, 1998).

In 1981, the Council of Europe signed the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, the only binding international data privacy treaty. It established principles for states to transpose into domestic legislation (Council of Europe, 1981).

In 1995, the EU released the Data Protection Directive, which “solidified” the EU Data Protection model (European Commission, 1995; de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015). In 1998, the UK enacted the Data Protection Act to implement the 1995 EU Directive (United Kingdom, 1998). It established the Data Protection Authority, an independent body with the responsibility to “uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals” (ICO, 2017). In 2002, the EU enacted the Directive Concerning the Processing of Personal Data (European Commission, 2002).

Under the 1995 EU Directive, businesses may not transfer personal data outside of the EEA unless the country meets an adequate level of protection, or if a derogation under the Directive applies (European Commission, 1995). This can be done through the deployment of mechanisms that establish an adequate level of protection such as model clauses or binding corporate rules. However, the Directive still significantly restricts the cross-border transfer of data. Under the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR), effective May 2018, a territory or specified sector within the country itself may provide adequate protection (European Commission, 2017).

Information Privacy Regulatory Environment: People's Republic of China

Although the PRC does not have a general data protection act, “traces of data protection are found in a variety of sector-specific laws and regulations, a combined reading of which suggests China’s cumulative approach to data protection” (de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015). In contrast to the establishment of privacy as a fundamental right, which is found in basic legal doctrine of both the EU and UK, the protection of privacy remains a “fractured, episodic, record-targeted patchwork of laws” (Wakana, 2003).

The Chinese Constitution only explicitly notes privacy once in Article 40, providing for the “freedom and privacy of correspondence” (NPC, 2004). Article 38 has been used to demonstrate some evidence of the right to privacy as it provides for the personal dignity of citizens of the PRC (Zhu, 1997; Wang, 2011). However, these articles do not require the Chinese government to actively protect individual privacy.

The most widely used provision to enforce privacy protection in China is Article 253(a) of Criminal Law (de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015). Amendment VII provides that selling or illegally providing information is a criminal offense that shall be punished and fined. Computer information systems crimes may be used in a data protection context to the extent that there is personal data stored in such systems (Supreme People’s Court of the PRC, 2015). However, the Article only refers to the sale or purchase of personal data (Supreme People’s Court of the PRC, 2015).

Article 101 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law provides for the general right to reputation (NPC, 1986). Once again, it does not explicitly mention a right to privacy.

However, the Supreme Court has treated the disclosure of personal information as a potential infringement of the right to reputation (de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015). Legal scholars note that the abandonment of traditional Chinese civil law culture and the transplant of western civil law legal traditions “must be integrated to enter traditional Chinese society and emerge as a new Chinese tradition” (Wang and Zhang, 2015).

Tort Liability Law, which came into effect in 2010, explicitly refers to a right to privacy as one of the protected civil rights and interests under Article 2 (NPC, 2009). Article 36 provides that network users or service providers, such as a cloud service provider, who infringe upon a civil right and/or interest, such as the right to privacy, of another person through the network shall assume tort liability (NPC, 2009).

In 2012, the SC-NPC issued the Decision on Strengthening Internet Information Protection (“2012 SC-NPC Decision”) (NPC, 2013). This decision, as issued by the second-highest legislative body in the PRC, “constitutes the de facto data protection standard ... It regulates all personal data processing undertaken by the private sector in China today” (Greenleaf, 2014b). As Greenleaf argues, the decision is as notable for what it achieved as for what it failed to achieve and criticises its scope, principles and enforcement mechanisms (Greenleaf, 2014b). However, for a nation that barely mentions any right of privacy in its foundational legal framework and up until 2012 had hardly any forms of protection in place which provided for the right of privacy, its significance should not be understated in signifying a convergence of information privacy concerns with the United Kingdom.

Since the 2012 SC-NPC Decision, there have been further significant developments in online network governance. Regulations, effective or forthcoming, by the MIIT, SAIC and CAC form the basis of the country’s sectoral approach to data protection (Greenleaf, 2014b; MIIT, 2011, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; SAIC, 2016; CAC 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). Although scope is generally limited to specific sectors and exempts the government, they are still another significant step towards convergence with British approaches to the protection of information privacy as many of the principles found in such texts are similar to those of the OECD 1981 framework. Does this signal a cross-cultural convergence in information privacy concerns?

After the 2012 SC-NPC decision was released, the government broadened the regulatory scope of its 2011 Regulations on Standardising Market Order for Internet Information Services to include internet information service providers (IISPs) and

telecommunications operators. In 2012, the SAC released the Information Security Technology – Guidelines for Personal Information Protection Within Public and Commercial Services Information Systems (SAC, 2012). They defined sensitive personal information and provided for the right to rectification. They also touched upon data exports, noting that “absent express consent of the personal information subject, or explicit legal or regulatory permission, or absent the approval of the competent government agencies, the administrator of personal information shall not transfer personal information to an overseas recipient of personal information, including an individual located overseas or an organization or institution registered overseas” (SAC, 2012; Luo, 2017).

Although the scope extended to include any personal information processing through information systems, they are still limited in comparison to the EU and UK regulatory framework for data protection as they are only voluntary in nature. Luo furthermore writes that they did not gain traction in practice (Luo, 2017). However, Greenleaf notes that they could serve as a model for future Chinese data protection law upon the implementation of an enforcement mechanism (Greenleaf, 2014b).

As one can see in Appendix 8, there are a number of regulations currently under development. In November 2016, the MIIT released a draft of the Notice on Regulating Business Behaviours in the Cloud Service Market (“Cloud Service Notice”) for public comment (MIIT, 2016b). Article 7 requires cloud platforms to be located in China (MIIT, 2016b).

The American Chamber of Commerce in China expressed that this “would raise concerns under China’s WTO service commitments not to discriminate against foreign suppliers of VATS or computer services” and “increase operating costs” for foreign cloud service operators regardless of whether or not the foreign operator has an established partnership arrangement with a Chinese firm (The American Chamber of Commerce in China et al, 2016). With a potentially similar effect to Article 7 of the draft Cloud Service Notice, Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law, effective from June 2017, requires critical information infrastructure operators to store both personal and business data within the PRC (NPC, 2016). Data transferred overseas for business purposes is subject to a security assessment (NPC, 2016). Whether the imposition of stricter regulations for the governance of personal information stored in online infrastructure is a reaction to heightened user privacy concerns is a question this paper aims to help answer. Failure to adopt cloud platforms would set back the country’s five-year plan and related industrial policy initiatives. It is thus a strategic

national and economic imperative that information privacy concerns are addressed.

Solutions

The responsive regulatory model's application may be criticised as an overly simplified solution to a very complex problem, but early intervention in a relatively nascent industry through proper education of both risks associated with the storage of personal information and strategic gains associated with the enhanced protection of such personal information could significantly impact the industry's future development.

As important as the regulatory pyramids of support and sanctions themselves are the processes through which they are created. Both Chinese and British policy-makers must recognise the importance of corporate engagement and education. Governments should encourage the development of cross-industry groups, by funding research projects that bring together experts in law, business and engineering to find solutions to problems at legal, managerial and technical levels and supporting the work of third parties.

A multilateral dialogue should be fostered to address concerns for overseas data storage. Such a dialogue should not only be created with those who share the same values, but those who share the same concerns. It is evident that both Chinese and British users of the cloud have shared concerns and thus it is clear that more can be done to address them in a transborder context. The UK and PRC should work to (a) implement bilateral standards for data storage adequacy will enable the free flow of data and (b) minimise barriers to trade imposed through the implementation and enforcement of data localisation policies. By encouraging greater multilateral collaboration, policymakers and corporate management can encourage foreign parties to rise to their national standards of protection.

Conclusion

By identifying joint concerns across national and cultural boundaries, this paper hopes to serve as a catalyst for enhancing the weak yet vital multilateral information privacy dialogue. A stronger information privacy dialogue in the context of the cloud may not only allow us to better leverage the economic and social benefits that the platform offers, but also stimulate greater cooperation and understanding in equally vital aspects of the digital economy.

Only then will freedom of trade and enhanced communication capabilities enabled by advances in information technology serve as mutually reinforcing drivers of global prosperity.

The author believes it is imperative that we act now to build an interdisciplinary, multilateral dialogue between policy-makers and corporate management to identify the privacy-related challenges associated with the cross-border transfer of data in the context of the cloud.

Failure to foster such a dialogue will impede our ability to agree on appropriate solutions to balance concerns for information privacy and competitive innovation in the digital market, preventing nations, organisations and individuals from realising the benefits of the Fourth Industrial Revolution that World Economic Forum Chairman Klaus Schwab so heralded (Schwab, 2016).

Richard English



Definitions and Approaches in the Field of Terrorism Studies

Interview with Dr. Richard English

By Raúl Ruiz

Richard English is Professor of Politics at Queen's University Belfast, where he is also Distinguished Professorial Fellow in the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice.

Professor English's research focuses on the politics and history of nationalism, political violence, and terrorism, with a particular focus on Ireland and Britain. His books include *Does Terrorism Work? A History* (OUP, 2016), *Modern War: A Very Short Introduction* (OUP, 2013), *Terrorism: How to Respond* (OUP, 2009), *Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (Pan Macmillan, 2006), *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Pan Macmillan, 2003), *Ernie O'Malley: IRA Intellectual* (OUP, 1998), and *Radicals and the Republic: Socialist Republicanism in the Irish Free State 1925-1937* (OUP, 1994).

He is a Fellow of the British Academy, a Member of the Royal Irish Academy, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, an Honorary Fellow of Keble College Oxford, and an Honorary Professor at the University of St Andrews.

Biography Source: [http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/richard-english\(352eef69-a4ad-49b3-b733-bdd67e7102fa\).html](http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/richard-english(352eef69-a4ad-49b3-b733-bdd67e7102fa).html)

Q To begin with, I would like to ask you, how did you first get interested and eventually focused on nationalism, political violence and terrorism. What features of these phenomena caught your attention?

A When I was a student at Oxford in the 1980s reading History, I was intrigued by the relationship between Marxism and nationalism. As an historian I wanted a case study; and as someone born in Belfast I had an interest in Ireland. So I became interested in the early-C20th Irish republican left. That then became the focus of my PhD, which became my first book, *Radicals and the Republic*. The interest in the major forces (nationalism, Marxism, religion, the state, political violence) continued.

Q Many have argued that one of the major obstacles in the fight against terrorism is that there is no legal definition of what terrorism is. There is no definition on which all 193 members of the UN General Assembly agree. In this respect, former contributor of our journal Dr. Alex Schmid, told us that: “Having a common definition by itself is only one step towards a solution. We have common definitions on war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, genocide and piracy, but these phenomena have not gone away”.

In your opinion, do we need a globally accepted legal definition? How different would counterterrorism international efforts be today if we had reached consensus on what terrorism is?

A There will never be a consensually agreed definition of as politically powerful a word as terrorism. Alex Schmid himself has now gathered hundreds, and they will continue to grow in number. But there is enough overlap between definitions to allow for meaningful discussion among scholars, and for meaningful action by states. And many terms (nationalism, the state, empire) are non-consensual. That should not immobilize us.

Q Regarding the success of a terrorist enterprise, Brian Jenkins has written that: “Terrorists often succeed tactically and thereby gain attention, cause alarm

and attract recruits. But their struggle has brought them no success, measured against their own stated goals, in that sense, terrorism has failed, but the terrorism phenomenon continues”. Moreover, in 2015 you published the book entitled, *Does Terrorism Work? A History*, where among other things, you focus principally on four of the major terrorist groups in the last fifty years, namely al-Qaida, IRA, Hamas, and ETA.

What is your opinion about the statements posed by Brian Jenkins and in your experience, is it safe to answer the question ‘Does terrorism work?’ in binary terms, such as ‘yes’ or ‘no’? What do you think about the success or failure of the terrorist cause?

A One of the aims of the book *Does Terrorism Work?* was to move away from yes/no answers, and towards a more layered and sophisticated analysis of the efficacy question. I agree that terrorist groups have tended to be more tactically successful than strategically successful. But there have been some strategic successes, one could argue. In my book, I suggest that, for example, the Jewish terrorists of the 1930s and 1940s could perhaps be considered one such case.

Q In 2016, Professor Edwin Bakker released the MOOC, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Comparing Theory and Practice*. When talking about counterterrorism, Professor Bakker asserts that: “Resilience is important in dealing with the negative impact of (fear of) terrorism. And a resilient society can cope with and recover from a terrorist attack”.

In your view, has enough work been done in terms of fear-management and communication? What challenges remain for communication and resilience to be integral parts of counterterrorism measures?

A I have a very good PhD student, Dominik Hamm, working on this communication topic now. I think resilience is indeed vital. And states have to communicate that message more, perhaps, than they have tended to do.

Q Some public officials and academics have raised the question whether terrorism can best be managed by a holistic or comprehensive approach. For instance, the Indonesian white or holistic approach has been a model to respond to

Islamist radicalism, combining hard and soft measures—for the main approach shifted from maintaining security to law enforcement, while also relying on deradicalization programs for detainees, and more.

Do you believe that a more comprehensive approach should be used to address terrorism? How hard would it be to assess the effectiveness of a holistic strategy?

A Some of the most effective ways of containing terrorism have combined different methods. The UK state's eventual containment of Northern Irish terrorism involved some hard power as well as considerable efforts at softer, even politically-negotiated, approaches. The combination of the two is the best way forward – though itself very difficult.

Q The Terrorism Research Initiative led by Dr. Alex P. Schmid—among other objectives—promotes research beyond fashionable topics in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism. Some examples of under- or un-researched topics listed by the initiative are: the side effects of counterterrorism or the link between media, terrorism, and the internet. Based on your expertise and opinion, what would you say are the major under- or un-researched topics in the field of terrorism studies that need to be addressed urgently?

A Work on victims of terrorism needs to go much further than it has. Javier Argomaniz has done good work. But far more still needs to be done. There are also many areas where case studies remain less numerous or persuasive than they might be. Peruvian terrorism is one example. US terrorism is another – including groups such as the Ku Klux Klan – clearly a terrorist organization, but rarely treated head-on as such in the terrorism literature.

For more information on the work carried out by Professor Richard English, we encourage all readers to visit the following website:

[http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/richard-english\(352eef69-a4ad-49b3-b733-bdd67e7102fa\)/publications.html](http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/richard-english(352eef69-a4ad-49b3-b733-bdd67e7102fa)/publications.html)

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